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A model of corporate growth ~s proposed which is composed of three components: geographical scope, breadth of product line and diversity between divisions. The article examines the role of breadth of product line and geographical scope for the effect they have on firms' operating ratios, strategic
stances and economic performance. Data gathered and analyzed on 96 diversified retailers demonstrates that key financial and operative ratios var y by
the degreee of both geographical scope and breadth of product line. Further,
this paper demonstrates that business level strategies can be determined by
these same variables. Analysis of economic returns shows marked differences
in performance based upon a firm's breadth of product line and geographical
scope. Analysis reveals that narrow product lines and national scope are associated with higher economic performance. Analysis also suggests that discount pricing strategies lead to very low performance. The paper sugge~ts
that new views on the components of strategy are warranted both for research
and for practice.

STRATEGIES OF GROWTH:
Forms, Characteristics and Returns
~ecent iy

at tention by students and practitioners of strategy has shifted

toward t he pro blems and needs of growth by businesses.

Concurrently much at-

t e nt1on ha a bee n given to several strategies or patterns by which firms can
g r ow.

Amo ng these pathways to growth are increased geographical scope, broad-

ening

ot product lines ma r ket and growth by diver sification.

This study ad-

d ret a es i ssues associated with the major strategic pat hways to growth.

In

par ticula r, we have examined diversified retail firms and found that firms
follow distinctively different pathways to growth which lead to fundamentally
differ ent strategic postures or forms .

Each of these forms is uniquely dif-

fere n t · f r om other forms in terms of its problems, opportunities and capabilitie s demande d of its management.
Work by

S~hoeffler

(1971) and Schoeffler , Buzzell and Heany (1974) has

d r awn broad- based attention to the fact that market share appears to have a
strong positive relationship with profitability.

I t appears that some firms

have appar ently known or sensed this fact for many years .
would

~ uggest

Examples which

this condition woul d include GE in home appliances, Anheiser -

Busch in the beer market , Coca- Cola and Pepsi in t he soft drink markets ,
Boeing in the commercial aircraft market , IBM in computers, Crown Cork and
Seal in the beverage filler market, Proctor and Gamble in many consumer markets and GM in the automotive tnarket .
As t he work of Schoeffler

~

al. at PIMS has become more broadl y spread,

the atte nt ion which both practitioners and students of policy paid to the effects of market share rose.

Que stions are raised as to whether higher market

shares cau sed higher returns or whether economies of scale or experience
curves were causing the increased returns .

Abell and Hammond (1979) cogently

,..
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suggest that all three effects are inextricably interwoven and comprise an i mportant part of business strategy.

Others such as Fruhan (1972) and Porter

(1980) have argued that increased market share affects profitability, but that
the costs of increasing market share may be inordinately costly or risky.
Nonetheless, increases in market share, increases in mar ket span or broader
geographical marke t s remain major options for firms wishing to grow.
Another strategic option fo r gr owth is the route of diversification.
That is,

f~rms

can choose to grow by_ building or buying their way into alto-

gether new pr oducts/market segment s .

Wrigley (1969) and Rumelt (1974) sampled

the Fortune 500 and discovered that a significant pe r centage of U. S. manufacturing firms had aggressively moved themselves from single product or market
strategies in the 1950's to mult i - product/multi-market strategies by the lat e
1960 ' s .

Rumelt ' s study reconfirmed \4rigley ' s findings that the late 1950 ' s

and. 1960 ' s was a very active period of diversification, but also suggested
that different forms of divers i fication were l ikely to lead to be tter economic
performances.

In particular, Rumelt's findings suggest that firms which ad,ded

new products/markets which had some important .l ink or connection to the "base··
busine~s

of the firm outperformed those firms which added lesser- related or

unrelated business activities .

Rumelt ' s study is particularly important for

the discovery of the vari ous forms or patterns of diversification which firms
in fact pur sue .
Inter est by firms in diversification still remains high as a cursory examination of the Wall Street Journal lv.lll establish.

Although inte r est re-

mains high, firms are now rethinking the guidelines, expectations and management efforts required to

make~

given business unit succeed .

forter (1975),

(1980) and Harr i gan ( 1979) have suggested that rigorous analysis of economic
and other forces operating in an industry segment can help predict the likeliood of succeeding or failing in that business.

Biggadik.e ( 1979), using
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PIMS data, suggests that firms entering into new businesses (diversified business) tend to perform poorly and demand significant infusions of cash and man-

agement effort for at least several years.

Miller and Kerin (1980) classified

diversified retailers by the degree of heterogeneity in the product offerings
and the markets served by different retail divisions of the firm.

The find-

ings indicated that firms with higher diversity (more heterogeneous products
or markets) did not perform better than firms with less diversity.

There was

some data to suggest that increasing diversity may in fact hinder economic
performance .

A number of firms have apparently discovered the dilemmas of in-

appropriate diversifications .

A recent Wall Street Journal (1980) article re-

ported on a number of firms who were analyzing and atte.m pting to sell off diversified businesses which showed a limited strategic "fit" or growth possibilities for the firm in question .

As the article noted, though, the interest

in diversification as a ' major pathway of growth was not abating, rather firms
appear to be more analytical or strategic in the selection of businesses to
buy and operate.
Another pathway to growth has received limited attention by policy researchers .

Firms may well look at broadening or expanding their product line

to serve the needs of existing and/or new customer segments as an important
pathway to growth.

Some noted examples of this strategy would include Gil-

lette adding shaving cream and other toiletries to its safety razor business,
or Coca-Cola adding other carbonated beverages (Fanta, Sprite, Mr . Pibb) as
well as orange juice and coffee to its product lines .

One observes the same

strategic phenomena in the automotive market as GM introduces Sevilles and
Chevettes to

broad~n

its product and market offerings .

This strategic stance

has been very successfully applied in industrial products by Boeing with the
successive introductions of its 727, 747, 737, 757 and 767 airplanes and by
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IBM's entry into the minicomputer market.

Unfortunately , far too l ittle re-

search has been done to examine the strategic impact of broadening product
lines as a major means of growth.
THIS STUDY

It appears clear that increased market penetration, adding diversification or broadening product lines, are three major vehicles by which firms can
choose to grow.

This study addresses the role of geographical scope and

breadth of product lines as central features of firm strategy.

A central con-

cern of this research has been to determine whether a firm ' s strategy and operating characteristics vary by whether the firm's geographical grasp is local, regional or national in scope.

A concurrent interest is the determina-

tion of whether a firm ' s strategy and operating characteristics vary by the
product line strategy pursued .

And finally, this paper examines the effect of

geographic scope and breadth of product line on economic performance .
Inasmuch as tbe study was undertaken to examine the strategies of growth
and the role of diversification in growth patterns , Fairchild's Fi nancial
Manual of Retail Stores (1976, 1977, 1978) were examined exhaustively •

.From

the several thousand major retail firms listed, we found 96 firms which fit
the criteria for inclusion in the universe which we call diversified retailers .

Data was collected and analyzed for all 96 firms .

The criteria for

sel ection included the fo llowing:
1)

2)

75% of sales and profits must be derived from retail operations.
Firms must have at

~east

3 distinctively different retail operations

which offered different pr oducts, and/or different price levels,
and/or serve markedly different markets.
The firms studied ranged along various size measures as shown in Figure 1
1elow.

'

.\
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Figure 1
SIZE OF FIRMS IN STUDY
Dollar Figures in Thousands
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Average Sales 1974-1978

$19,458

$14,240,000

$976,825

Average Fixed Assets 1974-1978

$ 1,077

$ 2,309,462

$131,225

Average Number of Stores 1974-1978

13

4,048

455

The universe includes a very broad array of firms ranging from relatively
small to the world's. largest retailers.

To gain a deeper understanding of the

firms and their strategies, data was examined from Fairchild's, Annual Reports, and 10-K's of the various firms as well as a questionnaire sent to the
firms.

To define and classify the strategies of firms and their patterns of

growth, tbree major aspects of their businesses were examined and classified.
AVENUES OF GROWTH
Geographic Scope
In line with our previous description, it was assumed that three major
options or avenues to growth are open to retailers.

The first major growth

option is for the firm to undertake to increase tbe regional or geographic
scope of its operations .

Virtually all retail firms begin operation, of ne-

cessity, in local or confined regional markets.

If the concept of the busi-

ness and its execution is reasonably successful, 't.'he firm may choose to extend
the franchise into a broader base or ultimately to take the business nationally.

This research categorized the geographical scope of firms' businesses in-

to tbree phases.

Local firms were defined as those operating in up to five

contiguous states whose markets and demographics were reasonably homogenous.
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Firms were defined as regional i f they extended beyond five contiguous s tates
and/or served demographically heterogeneous markets , but did not serve all
major regions and the. top 20 SMSAs.

National firms were defined as those

firms which served all major regions and had representation in the top 20
SMSAs.
Thus a major strategic direction which retail firms can and do choose to
pursue is the extension and development of the firm into new and heterogeneous
geographies and markets.

Thus, some firms with successful retail concepts

feel that their distinctive competence is knowledge of their local or regional
markets and choose to remain in those areas, but grow in other ways as will be
described later:

Examples would include firms such as Walgreen, Big Bear

Stores, R. H. Macy's and Federated Department Stores.

Other firms will equal-

ly diverse product offerings and strategies apparently feel their distinctive
competence resides in their merchandising and marketing skills and thus choose
to take their product/market concept and extend it nationally.

Sears, K-Mart ,

Tandy Corp., Zale Corp., and Cole National are particularly strong examples of
these strategic stances.
Breadth of Product Line
A second major avenue of growth for a retail firm was found to be the expansion in the breadth of product line offered by the firm.

Historically, re-

tail firms begin their histories with a relatively limited or narrow product
line.

With some success in operating with a given line of merchandise, a firm

can strategically choose to expand or broaden its line of offering to varyLng
deg'rees.

This not only alters its strategic stance in the market place, but

can change its target markets as well.

In this study, we classified firms in-

to three categories based on their breadth of product line in the firm 's
major division(s) .

Firms whose merchandise offering was a broad array of

:
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merchandise in both soft goods (clothing plus other fabrics such as towels or
draperies, etc.) and hard goods (appliances plus tools, cookware , etc.) were
classified as full line merchandisers .

Firms which carried broad lines of

merchandise in either soft or hard goods were classified as single line merchandisers.

Those which carried less than a full or broad line in either soft

or hard goods were classified as specialty stores.
Thus some firms choose to maintain narrow or very narrow product line and
grow by expanding the concept nationally.

Examples would include such firms

as Tandy (Radio Shack), Cole-National (key stores and optical departments in
all Sears stores).

Other firms, through their histories, choose to broaden

their product line in order to capture customers and serve several of their
needs.

Examples include grocery chains purchasing or

dev~loping

"drugstore"

chains to operate next door to the grocery business (Skaggs- Albertson, Giant
Foods, etc . ).

Other firms such as Sears, Federated, Allied and others become

full line merchandisers to meet much or most of a customer's retail needs
which enables them to draw customers into their stores and to then cross-sell
the same customer many items.
Diversi ty Between Divisions
A final pathway to growth is incorporated in the idea of building or acquiring businesses which are significantly and fundamentally different from
the base business of the firm in either the product line carried, the target
market sought, or in the method of serving the market.

Thus a firm may choose

to grow not by increasing geographic scope or adding to the breadth/product
line within a business or under a company name, but may feel the firm's distinctive competence is to serve many customers with many different specialty
or single line firms which are unconnected from each other.

Particularly po-

tent examples of this strategy can be seen in firms such as Zale Corp. which
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operates firms such as Zale Jewelr y, Guild Jewelry, Butler Shoes , Cullem &

.

Boren Sporting Goods and Skillern Drug Stores.

Other examples include Dayton-

Hudson, J . C. Penney and Gamble- Skogmo.
Thus we have suggested that firms,
three fundamental avenues of grovth.
Figure 2 bel ow.
three independent

particular~y

retailing firms, have

The model of this process is shown in

The model depicts the gr owth strategies as being composed of
com~onents.

Thus a firm may choose to grow by means of

addition of one or more of the avenues .

At a given point in a firm ' s history,

it could have developed and extended itself in all thr ee dimensions.
Figure 2
AVENUES OF GROWTH

Geographical Expansion

Adding Diversified
Businesses

Broadening the
Product Line

To test the independence of these strategies, a three dimension chisquare test (TRI-CHI), Kerin , Woodward and Reeves (1975), was employed as
shown in Figure 3 below.

The analysis demonstrates that the three components

are essent ially independent of each other .

,
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Figure 3

INCIDENCE OF GROWTH STRATEGIES
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE

DIVERSITY
(Limited)

BREADTH

OF
PRODUCT
LI NE
~pecialty

Loca1

Excluded
by
Definition

Single
Line
Full

DIVERSITY
(Moderate)

&eg~ona1 Nat i ona 1

DIVERSITY
(High)

L oca 1 Reg~ona1 Nat 1 ona1

L oca 1 Regiona1 Nat~ona1

3

2

2

5

4

1

0

2

15

6

1

3

16

1

2

8

1

4

1

3

3

8

1

2

2

0

.

~.oine

x2 = 5 . 65

df = 4

p = . 226

When two way analyses are performed on the pairwise relationship of
growth components as shown in Figure 4 below, a close relationship is discov- •
ered between geographical scope and breadth of product line and between geographical scope and diversity between divisions .

The strategic, statistical

and economic impact of this relationship will be examined in some detail below.

Figure 4 shows a strong association between breadth of product line and

geographical scope.

The pattern of association is clearly that local and re-

gional firms tend strongly to operate with a single line of merchandise.

..

As a

secondary pattern, both regionals and locals tend to be made up of dual line
stores.

National firms tend notably to be comprised of specialty stor es .

t '.
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Figure 4

INCIDENCE OF GROWTH STRATEGIES (TWO WAY)
FREQUENCY OF BREADTH OF PRODUCT LINE

s pee i a 1 ty

FREQUENCY OF
GEOGRAPHICAL
SCOPE

Si J!g.l e Li ne

Full Li ne

Local

3
9. 4%

20
62. 5%

28 . 1%

Regional

8
16.3%

30
61 . 2%

22 . 4%

3

4

Nat i onal

8
53. 3%

20 . 0%

26. 7%

df

=4

9

ll

p

32
33. 3%
49
51 . 0%
15
15 . 6%

= .005

FREQUENCY OF DIVERSITY BETWEEN DIVISIONS
1"l.mi te d

FREQUENCY OF
GEOGRAPHICAL
SCOPE

Mod erate

HiLg,h

Local

19
59. 4%

8
25. 0%

iO
Regional

20 . 4%

29
59. 2%

10
20.4%

49
51 . 0%

National

6
40 . 0%

6
40. 0%

3
20. 0%

15
15.6%

X2

=

13. 52

=4

df

5

15 . 6%

p

32
33%

= . 009

FREQUENCY OF DIVERSITY BETWEEN DIVISION
Li mlte
. d

FREQUENCY OF
BREADTH OF
PRODUCT LINE

Moderate

a·l.g:h

Specialty

5
26. 3%

57.9%

3
15.8%

Si ngle Line

22
41.5%

20
37. 7%

20.8%

8

Full Line

33 . 3%

12
50 . 0%

X2

=

2 . 69

11

df

=4

11

4

16 . 7%
p = • 611

19
19.8%
53
55.2%
24
25 . 0%
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Analysis of the patterns of association diversity between divisions and
geographical scope indicates another important set of relationships.
fi rms tend strongly to have only limited to moderate diversity.

Local

Regional

firms on the other hand tend noticeably to have moderate to high diversity.
National firms like local firms, tend to have low to moderate diversity altho ugh the relationship is relatively weak.
More important than the simple association of growth strategies though
are the questions of the differences required to manage these different forms
and the performance differences between the types.

We examine these in the

next section.

OPERATING AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS BY TYPE
A number of important characteristics were examined which related to the
internal characteristics which accompanied each growth strategy.

Included in

this examination were the firms' return on total assets, equity, total capital
and return on sale s as measures of the economic viability of each growth avenue.

Further analysis was conducted to examine the components of business

level strategies associated with the corporate growth strategies.

Variables

examined in this regard included gross margin/sales, interest/sales, inventory
turnover, sales/stores, sales/fixed assets, sales/total assets, sales/total
employees, sales/managerial employees, sales/corporate personnel , market
share and price/quality relationships.
This last variable is one of some importance and uniqueness and thus warrants some explanation.

As described previously (Miller and Springate , 1978),

firms were sent questionnaires asking a wide array of questions regarding
their corporate and business level strategies.

Three such questions asked the

firms to define its market share, its price levels and merchandise quality

12

levels relative to that firm's main competitors in their principal markets.
Early analysis (Miller and Springate 1978 and Springate and Miller 1978) had
suggested an

impo~tant

relationship between both market share and price/

quality relationships to economic returns among these firms .

In this study we

combined relative prices and relative quality levels into a new variable
called priqual.

If a respondent reported that merchandise quality level was

higher than price levels relative to its competition, we defined that business
as having a discount price strategy.

If, on the other hand, relative price

and quality were at the same level, i . e., both lower than, equal to, or higher
than the competition, the firm was categorized as having a congruent

p~ice

strategy.
OPERATING AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS BY REGIONAL TYPE
The analysis of operating characteristics and tactics employed
ent geographic growth strategies was quite dramatic .
ships were statistically significant, others were not.

~y

differ-

Many of these relationNonetheless each was

quite suggestive of the demands, problems encountered and the tactics employed
in each growth phase.

It should be remembered that statistical significance

levels are important only as a suggestion of this degree of difference between
types inasmuch as the data represents the total universe of diversified retailers in the U. S. and Canada .

The operating characteristics of each stage

of the geographical growth strategy are shown below in Figure 5.
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Figure 5
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS BY STAGE OF GEOGRAPHICAL GROWTH STRATEGY
Dollar Figures in Thousands
Operating
Characteristics/Tactics
Five Year Averag,e Values
( 1974-1978)

Geographic Stage
Overall
Mean

Analysis of
Variance
Significance Level

Local
(n=32)

Regional
(n=49)

National
(n=15)

Gross Margin (% of Sales)

30. 96

28. 09

37.97

30.53

.002

Inventory Turnover Ratio

6.29

6. 18

2.64

5. 66

.065

(n=96)

Average Sales $ per Store

$3,322.

$3,925.

$4 J 800.

$3 J 860.

.636

Average Sales $ per Fixed
Assets $

$11.45

$11.78

$8.45

.$ 11.15

.294

l

Average Sales $ per Total
Assets $

$2.69

$2. 92

$2 .0 8

$2.71

.03~

Average Sales $ per Total
Employees

$32.08

$45.67

$36.24

$39. 99

.118

Average Sales $ per Corporate
Employee

$2,438.

$10,657.

$5,855.

$7,314.

.672

Average Sales $ per Corporate
Professional Employees

$7,134.

$8,603 .

$4 J 861.

$7,318.

.513

Market Share (% of Group Above
Equal Market Share)

11%

25%

29%

22. 2%

Price Quality Strategy (% of
Group Using Discount
Strategy)

58%

70%

50%

62. 5%

Thus from Figure 5 we can begin to see that the operating characteristics, problems and tactics at each stage of geographical growth are quite
'
~

different .

Several of these

while others are less so.

characteri~tics

are statistically quite dramatic

Those which are not statistically extreme are less

clear as to their effects, although the pattern which exists between these
variables is quite suggestive of some important differences between these
stages.
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The National ' s .Strategy
In particular we note from Figure 5 that national firms have substantially
higher gross margins (38%) than locals and regionals.

Some of this may be due

to their size and the purchase economies available to them, but, notice that
the national group has fewer firms with a discount price strategy (more congruent· price strategies) and a substantially greater percentage of firms with
predominant shares of market.

This data would suggest that most nationals may

well have substantial purchasing economies, but push activity toward reasonably high prices to support high gross margins.
aiming for and

perha~s

Mo re nationals appear to be

achieving predominant shares of the markets in which

they compete which enables them to sustain and control the price leadership
exhibited by the high gross margins they have.

As one would suspect, national

firms, wit.h this high price, high _gross margin strategy have very low inventory turnover ratios.

In fact nati0nal firms' average inventory turnovers are

only 43% as high as regional firms and 38% as high as local firms .
In terms of average annual sales (in qollars per store) it is interesting
to note a linear relationship from local to national .

Locals have the

smallest sales per store ratio while nationals have the most .

The broader the

area served, the greater the firm appears to center its focus on utilizing its
stores as an important competitive edge.

This conclusion is supported by the

sales per fixed asset and sales to total asset ratios in Figure S.

Here it

will be noted that locals and regional stores have nearly equal and above
average sales .per fixed asset dollar whereas national firms have substantially
lower sales per fixed asset dollar .
s tan~ially

Apparently, national firms invest in sub-

more dollars per store per sales dollar expected.

Thus, national

firms apparently spend a great deal of money (in relation. to sales) in buildings and fixtures as a central competitive

com~onent

of their strategies .

..
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Nationals' sales per fixed asset ratio are substantially lower than regionals
or locals.

Thus comparatively, nationals' strategies appear to be that of

high overhead, high cost, high service, non-discount, high gross margin operations.
The Regionals' Strategies
The regionals' strategies appear as the near opposite of the nationals.
Regional firms are archtypically discounters.

Over 70% of the regionals de-

fined themselves to us as discounters and their operating data confirms this
assessment.

They have the lowest gr oss margins of any type (only 28%) .

figure is 26% lower than the nationals and 12% lower than locals.

This

Regional

firms' inventory turnover ratios are above the average though still below the
locals.

Likewise, regionals' sales dollars to stores is slightly above aver-

age though less than -national firms.
The data on sales/fixed assets, .sales/total assets and sales/emplo"yees
strongly support the assessment that

~egionals

employ discount price strategy.

Regional firms have the highest annual sales per annual fixed asset and total
asset dollar ratio of any type.

In fact regionals' sales to fixed asset ra-

tios are nearly 40% higher than national firms. equally dramatic as the total
I

asset and the annual sales/employee ratios .

Regional firms have the highest

sales per employee ratios of all type firms.

Particularly dramatic are the

very high sales to manager ratios and sales to corporate employee ratios for
regional firms whicb are respectively 77% and 82% higher than national firms.
Thus regional firms appear to be disproportionately composed of low overhead
business with inexpensive facilities and proportionately few employees.

The

archtypical regional firm then is the low overhead, low service type and low
gross margin operation associated with discount businesses .
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The Local Strategies
Until we introduce an analysis on the breadth of product line, it will be
difficult to make clear what the locals' strategies are.

For now let us note

that they are composed of about 60% discounters and few report having a predominant share of

mar~et.

As

a group they have slightly above average gross

margins, very high inventory turns, low sales/stores, high sales to fixed
assets.

They have low sales per employee and very low sales per corporate em-

ployee 'but very high sales per professional/managerial employee.
The typology of locals appears to be predominantly that of entrepreneurial firms still seeking an identity and clear cut strategy to pursue.

That is,

no distinct picture emerges regarding either discount versus congruent price
strat.e gies or gross margins.

Inventory turns are very high indicating a very

c lose attention to choosing merchandise or lines which will be sought actively
by . the market they serve.

In fact, this appears to be the strength of the lo-

cal, i.e., the intimate knowledge of the market and what it will buy regardless of the price strategy or gross margins involved.

Likewise, locals tend

not to generate much in terms of sales per stores though they have relatively
low cost stores.

They don't generate high sales per employee or corporate

ployee indicating they have a proportionately high number of employees.

em~

But

when it comes to sales per corporate professional and manager, their ratios
are very high.

Apparently, locals have very "thin" managerial structures.

That is, they are closely held and/or managed by a proportionately few managers or executives much in the standard form of early , entrepreneurial style
firms.

ANALYSES OF THE THREE STAGES AND PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES
Thus we have seen that the geographical scope or stage of a firm :is
strongly associated with distinct operating strategies.

Thus national firms
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tend to be congruent pricers with high gross margins, very low inventory
turns, with large, expensive stores, high total asset bases, proportionately
large selling staffs, large corporate offices and many corporate managers .
They also tend to have or attempt to have large market shares.

Regional firms

are almost the opposite with many d'iscounters with low gross margins, high inventory turns, proportionately low cost f.acilities, low total assets and low
ratios of employees in all categories particularly corporate employees .

Lo-

cals, as we have noted, are less clear cut though they appear to be tightly
held and/or managed by a limited number of executives whose main efforts appear to be in merchandising to their particular market which they handle well .
They tend to have low fixed ass_e ts, but have a high number of employees (excluding managers) to help sell merchandise.
The important question remaining is what if any performance differences
exist between these three types of firms .

In Figure 6, below, four major mea-

sures of performance are shown for each type of firm .

Data from each firm was

gathered to analyze the five year av·e rage return on sales, total assets,
equity, and total capital employee.

The first three

measur~s

are relatively

well known and little explanation is necessary except to say that return on
sales was included because previous work done by the senior author had indicated that the predominant concern and target which many retail managers
sought was return on sales.

The fourth measure, return on total capital em-

ployed, is a Barnardian (1973) measure extended by Rumelt (1974) and others .
It assumes that the best measure of a firm's performance is its capacity to

..

generate returns to all classes of long term funding sources (debt and
equity) .

Thus return on total capital is the pretax profits plus interest

paid divided by total long term debt and equity .
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Figure 6
5 YEAR AVERAGE PERFORMANCE BY GEOGRAPHICAL GROWTH STRATEGY

(expressed in %)
Stage

Geo~raphical

Analysis of
Variance
Significance
Level

Local

Regional

National

Overall
Mean

Return on Sales

1. 84%

1.93%

3.71%

2. 18%

. 000

Return on Total Assets

4. 53%

4. 76%

6. 77%

5. 00%

. 055

Return on Equity

8.94%

10. 03%

14.61%

10.38%

. 027

11.23%

10 . 57%

12. 06%

11.02%

. 524

Return on Total
Capital Employed

Examination . of Figure 6 clearly

indi~ates

that the national firms with

their high cost, high gross margin, non-discount strategies are clearly superior to very superior performers no matter what criterion is cbosen.

Nation-

als J>erform well above the mean in all categories and are the top ranked performer in all but return on capital.

The regionals on the other hand with

their low cost, low gross margin, discount strategies tend to be poor performers regardless of criteria.

They perform below the mean in all criteria and

rank last or very near to last on all but return on equity.
other hand remain an interestingly mixed bag .

The locals on the

Their return on sales, total

assets and equity is poor, but their return on total capital · ranks second
among the groups and is above the overall average.

Apparently locals, being

tightly held and closely managed, do not do well in terms of return on sales,
assets, or equity, but they do a creditable job of utilizing the total capital
they employ.

Whether this is due to the fact that owners and executives are

more closely related and thus more directly communicating concerns with return
on total capital is not known for sure or whether it is due to the difficulty
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they experience in terms of raising capital.

It must be noted that variance

in performance by firms was notably higher for locals tban other forms, suggesting that some locals were reasonably high return businesses and some were
quite low in returns.
Nonetheless, the clearer picture as we have shown is that national firms
do have markedly different strategies on the whole than do regionals.
with these strategies go a substantially better economic return.

And

Several

questions suggest themselves from this analysis which are in need of further
examination.

First among these is the question of whether the national scope

of firms determines the strategy (and performance) or vice-versa.
clearly deviant models which exist in each strategy.

There are

Among the nationals are

such classic discounters as ·K-Mart and Woolworth (Woolco) pitted against such
non-discount strategies as Sears, Wards, and Federated Department Stores.

On-

ly two of the fifteen nationals are clear cut discounters suggesting that the
discount strategy is either too difficult or as yet too new a phenomenon to
effectively operate nationwide.

MY

guess is that the former is true in that

the discount strategy appears to require low managerial overhead dollars to
sustain the low gross margins of such a business.

The problem of managing na-

tionwide businesses would appear to require large corporate staffs to help coordinate buying, shipping, promotional advertising, etc.

Thus national dis-

count operations may be economically stable forms for only very few excellently managed businesses.

The failure of W. T. Grant tends to support this argu-

ment.
Another question in need of further examination is wbether the strong
economic performance of nationals is due to their strategy or their national
scope and any advantage which that may give.

Although this paper shows the

national scope and strategies are linked it cannot definitely determine
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causality.

As a matter of speculation, I am prone to believe that the high

overhead, high sales staff, high gross margin strategy, though not necessarily
the least expensive form of retail outlet for the consumer, may in fact be the
form which best satisfies and/or serves the consumer in fact.

Our performance

data sugges'ts that over a five year period incorporating two of the worst and
best retail years in current history (1974-1978), the consumer was willing to
reward the high cost., high service strategy with very high returns.
sug~ests

PIMS data

that firms with higher quality products than competitors tend to out-

perform, over time, firms with lesser quality products.

Consumers appear t o

be willing to pay for the extra service and overhead costs associated with
this strategy.

A CEO of a major fast food chain once confided to the senior

author that discounting and being aggressively price competitive was a pointless strategy because as he put it, "The consumer you draw is a price loyal
customer.

He's more interested in price than he is in what it is you can dis-

tinctly do to serve him."

Perhaps this is a lesson which the nationals have

learned and codified into their strategies .

Further investigation is clearly

warranted.
Ofher issues in need of examination include the managers' strategic problem of lllOVing from stage to stage.

Whereas it appears from this investigation

that each stage (other than local) has a distinctive set of strategies, what
then are the

~plications

to a national?

for growing from a local to a regional?

A regional

In addition to the financial problem of supporting a geograph-

ically expanding business, what strategies are necessary?
tions must be met?

What market condi-

The current day national firms ostensibly grew to national

status many decades ago .

Sears and Wards grew by being the only national fitQ

wtich could serve the majority of American markets.

They offered good quality

me~chandise, with good service and competitive price in a period when few good
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alternatives were available .
~as

phenomenal.

The growth in the 60's and 70's of discounters

The growth of local discounters to a regional basis appeared

to draw on a distinctive competence of low overhead and low price.
the only way to grow in regional status?
the easiest way?

The most effective way?

Is that
Or is it

Further work clearly needs to be done to determine the pat-

terns and problems as firms move from stage to stage.

Clinical work with a

few firms, examined closely, would be of major help to clarify the problems
and opportunities to growing geographically.
OPERATING

M~D

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS BY PRODUCT BREADTH

We have seen that two ·differences in geographical scope of retail firms
has a marked effect on these firms' strategies, operating characteristics and
economic performance.

Even more dramatic is the relationship of these charac-

teristics and the breadth of product line.

Figure 7 below presents the oper-

ating characteristics by breadth of product line by these firms.
Specialty Stores' Characteristics
Examination of Figure 7 results in a clear and definitive picture of the
strategic stance and opera.ting characteristi<:s of specialty stores.

As one

might expect from retail firms specializing in narrow, hard to find or unique
lines of merchandise, the firms in this category tend to have very high gross
margins (37.4%), very low inventory turnover ratios, and very low sales to
stores ratios.

Furthermore, specialty strategies tend to call for a very

large number of stores (850) of relative "normal" cost .

In terms of the sales

to fixed assets and sales to total assets, specialty firms showed up just
slightly below average.

Likewise, sales to total employees, corporate person-

nel and managerial personnel ratios were slightly below the mean .

Thus, spe-

cialty firms tending to specialize in carrying unique specialized and hard to
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Figure 7
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS BY BREADTH OF PRODUCT LINE STRATEGY
Breadth of Product Line Stage
Overall
Mean
(n=96)

Analysis of
Variance
Significance
Level

Operating Characteristics
Five Year Average Values
(1974-1978)

Specialty
(n=l 9)

Gr oss Margin (% of Sales)

37. 41

27 . 76

31.48

30.53

. 000

3. 44

6.36

5.88

5.66

.1341

. 81

.79

1.32

. 92

. 0085

$1 ,129

$2,4 75

$9,083

$3 ,860

. 0000

Average Sales $ per Fixed
Asset $

$10 .85

$13.89

$5 . 33

$11 .15

. 0000

Average Sales $ per Total
Asset $

$2 .37

$3.23

$1.84

$2.71

.0000

Average Sales $ per Total
Employees

$38 .31

$4 7. 45

$32 . 79

$39.99

.0731

Average Sales $ per Corporate Professional
Employees

$5 ,921

$1,764

$13,438

$7,314

.414

$6,815

$4,812

$9,855

$7,317

.168

29%

27%

14%

22.2%

Inventory Turnover Ratio
Interest Cost (% of Sales)
Average Sales $ per Store
(in thousands)

Average Sales $ per
agerial Employees

Single Line
(n=53)

Full Line
(n=24)

Man-

Market Share (% of Group
Above Equal Market Share)

. 41]
Price Quality Strategy
(% Group Using Discount Strategy)

x2

57%

47%

78%

62 . 5%

.1 75

find merchandise operate strategically by clearing high gross margins, having
many stores of regional or national scope (Figure 7}.

Further , they tend to

have moderately expensive facilities and relatively large total assets to
sales to support the gross margins they command .

They also tend to have rela-

tively high selling expenses to sales dollar volume.

Despite this apparently

"unproductive" use of assets, this category, as we shall see later, has quite
s trong economic performances .
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Single Lj,ne Store Cha,racteristics
Single line stores comprised the largest (n = 53 or 55% of the total) and
most confusing categor ization in this study .

Nearly 78% of this group report-

ed t h emselves to be discounters whereas less than 50% of t he specialty or dual
line stores reported themselves as such.

The data in Figure 7 would seem to

substantiate the claim of discounter for this

g~oup.

They had extremely low

gross margins (28%) , very high inventory turns (6.4), high sales to store ,
sales to fixed and total assets and high sales to employee ratios.
Further examination revealed though that single line firms were made up
of two separate categories based on their gross margins .

By dividing firms on

the basis of whether their five year average gross margins were less than or
greater than 30% a new picture emerged .
had gross margins less t han 30Yo (x

Of the 53 single line firms, 37 (70%)

= 24 . 3% a = 3 . 5) and 16 (30%) had gross

margi"(ls grea t er than 3Q% (x == 34. 5 o

= 3 . 4) .

Thus the self reports of _dis-

count strategies appear roughly corr ect.
More dramatic though ar e the differences in strategic stances and economic pe r formances of these two groups as shown in figure 8 below.

In par ticu-

lar , it is notewor thy that t he low gross margin , single line firms have extremely high sales to fixed asset and total asset ratios.
high sal es to to t al employee ratios .
the highest for any grouping .

They also have very

Likewise , inventory t ur nover rati os were

Interestingly , low gross margin, single l ine

firms reported fairly l ow to quite low sales to corporat e employees and sales
to managerial employees .

The data indicates that like regional firms, this

classification clearly includes the vast majority of the classic discount
store operation.

Examination of some of the firms in the group corroborates

this conclusion.

Firms sorted into this category include K- Mart, Roses,

Zayres, Skaggs, Fed Mart, Super Dollar Stores and Woolworth, among others .
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Figure 8
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGLE LINE FIRMS LOW vs . HIGH GROSS MARGINS
Operating Characteristics
Five Year Average Values
(1974-1978)

Low
Gross Margin
(n = 37)

Inventory Turnover Ratio

6. 55

Average Sales $ Per Store
(In Thousands)

High
Gross Margin
(n = 16)

Overall
Mean
(n = 53)

Analysis of
Variance
·Significance
Level

5.93

6. 36

• 73

$2,699

$1, 95 7

$2,475

. 22

Average Sale $ Per Fixed
Assets $

$14.67

$12.11

$13 . 89

. 28

Sale $ Per Total
Asset $

$3.40

$2.82

$3.23

.os

Average Sales $ Per Total
Employee

$52.58

$29 •.47

$47.45

.os

Average Sal~s $ Per
Corporate Employee

$2,016

$946

$1,764

.10

Average Sales $ Per
Managerial Employ.ee

$5' 919

$1,768

$4' 811

.13

Averag~

The high gross margin, single line firms are markedly different in operating characteristics as was noted in Figure 8 above.

All of their productiv-

ity ratios 1(sales to assets, stores, employees etc. ) tend to be low to very
low.

These firms, though offering similar breadth and lines of merchandise,

have been able to strategically establish themselves and their operations such
that they can command quite handsome gross margins .

The result of this will

be seen in Figure 9 below which demonstrates that the low gross margin single
lines are by far the poorest group in economic

performance~ where~s

the high

gross margin single lines are clearly superior performers.
Full Line Store Characteristics
The full line stores are composed almost completely of what has come
to be known as the full line, general merchandise stores such as Macy's,
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Federated Department Stores (Bloomingdales, Filenes, Bullocks, etc. ), Sears,
etc.

~ards,

As a group, they tend to have moderate gross margins, moderate to

high turnover over ratios, high interest expense to sales ratios (due to large
inventories and company owned credit cards) .

As expected they tend to have

large, expensive stores (downtown stores and shopping center anchor stores)
with high sales to store ratios but very low sales to fixed asset $' sand total asset $ •

Furthermore, -ehey tend to have extensive salespeople as noted by

the low sales to total employee ratio.

As a group (especially if excluding

Sears and Wards) they tend to be geographically organized with mos1: managerial
people reporting to the geographical unit and relatively few corporate personnel.

As

a group they tend to eschew discounting and justify their gross mar-

gins by means of elaborate buildings and facilities, extensive

inventories~

crenit services, and store sales support.

ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR STRATEGIES AND OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS
The analysies of the four product line strategies demonstrates distinctly
different strategic stances taken by firms in each group.
store~

The Sl'ecialty

tend to have many small stores and carry unusual or specialized mer-

chandise which is offered at very high gross margins.
group attempt to discount.

Few of the specialty

Their "productivity" ratios tended to be below the

mean for all categories though they were never the lowest ranking of any
group.
The single line firms tended to divide into two distinct camps .

The

largest. group was composed of the classic discount store group which operated
with limited lines of merchandise offered as discounted items.
have very low gross margins, very high inventory turns.

These firms

Their "productivity"

ratios on all except sales to · corporate and managerial employees was extremely
high.
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The other single line strategy was composed of firms who either offered
merchandise similar to the "discounters" or offered specialty items, premium
priced clothing 2!. furniture.

Those that offered traditional "discount" type

merchandise appeared (though not tested) to choose locations, especially rural, where competition was less intense and thus not demanding lesser prices.
The other group appeared to differentiate themselves by offering a broad line
of hard or soft. goods but with more "premium" quality .
The full line stores were the clearest to classify inasmuch as they comprised the highly visible and quite familiar general department store.

As a

whole, their strategies and operating characteristics are midway between the
extremes of either specialty stores and the discount single line stores.
The remaining question then is, given the clearly different strategic
stances which firms can take in terms of breadth of product lines, how does
this affect their long term economic performance?
~ingle

As seen in Figure 9, tbe

line high gross margin firms have the best economic performance while

the low gross margin, single line firms ("discounters") are by far the worst
economic performers.
the

ov~rall

Specialty stores perform strongly, performing well above

mean in all cat·egories and ranking second behind the high gross

margin, single line firms..

Full line firms (general department stores) per-

form above the average in returns on sales, but pe rform below average on returns on assets, equity, and total capital.
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Figure 9

5 YEAR AVERAGE PERFORMANCE BY BREADTH OF PRODUCT LINE STRATEGY
(Expressed in %)

Specialty
Store

Product Line Stages
Single Line, Single Line,
Low Gross
High Gross
Full
Margin
Line
Margin

Overall
Mean

Analysis of
Variance
Significance
Level

Return on Sales

2. 93%

1. 16%

2.74%

2. 77%

2.18%

.ooo

Return on Total
Assets

6. 15%

3. 73%

6.86%

4.81%

5.00%

. 002

Return on Equity

12.27%

8.05%

13.69%

10.29%

1'0.38%

.024

Return on Total
Capital Employed

11 . 50%

10. 34%

13.20%

10. 26%

11 . 02%

. 151

From Figure 9, we note that returns vary significantly by group.

One

very strong conclusion to be drawn is that despite their very bigh productivity ratios (turns, sales/assets, sale/employees, etc.) discount operators· as a
whole perform very poorly no matter what performance criteria one chooses.
There are exceptions of course; K-Mart, Inc., Skaggs, Inc., Super Dollar
Stores, Reeks and several other firms' five year performances were well above
the overall sample's mean in all measures of performance.

Nonetheless, for

the group as a whole it seemed clear that without a very unique and tightly
controlled strategy, discounting is a strategically unviable form of long term
operation.
The best economic return accrued to the single line, high gross margin
firms .

..

These firms have apparently chosen one of two s t rategies as the basis

upon which they 'choose to compete.

As

noted previously, about half of this

group carried very similar lines and types of merchandise as the discount
group, but sold them at much higher margins in less competitive geographical
areas or markets (rural areas for example).

The other half of the group oper-

ates more l i ke specialty stores by carrying a broad line of relatively
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specialized merchandise.
ly.

Apparently these strategic efforts pay off handsome-

This group's performance was 20% to 37% above the overall mean pn various

1neasures of return.

On all measures except return on total capital, the sta-

tistical level of significance was high.
Specialty stores also performed quite well overall.

On all but the re-

turn on capital measure, specialty stores performed 18% to 34% above the overall mean.

The strategies of specialty stores is revealing .

They have slight-

ly below average productivity ratios and very low turnover ratios.

Their

strategy is not to gain economies of scale or strong overhead utilization.
Rather their strategies are geared toward picking specialized unique or hard
to acquire product lines around which the target consumer is relatively price
inelastic.
tenance of

The main source of profitability then is to be found in the main~heir

very high gross margins.

This strategic stance works appar-

ently because these firms have been able to maintain a choice of merchandise
and a method of delivery which enough consumers are willing to support tbis
stance .
This final category is the familiar full line, general department store
firms . _ Their strategies are based upon carrying a broad range of botb hard
goods and soft goods, having
sales staffs.

large~

expensive stores and relatively large

On the whole, this group attempts to be anchor stores or points

of attraction for consumers into shopping centers by being a one stop facility .

The broad array of merchandise encourages the one stop shopping as well

as attempts to cross sell the consumer other merchandise than was contemplated

..

_

when entering the store.
turnover ratios .

As

a group they have about average gross margins and

Their sales to store ratio is very high .

tivity ratios are consistently low.
are extre1nely low.

But their produc-

Sales to fixed assets and sales to assets

Sales to employees is likewise low, although sales to
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corporate personnel and sales to managerial employees are quite high.

Per-

formance of this g roup is relatively weak reflecting the weak productivity ratios.

Return on assets and equity is below the overall mean and return on to-

tal capital is the worst of all the groups.

Only in return on sales do the

dual line firms perform moderately well.
CONCLUSIONS
This study has suggested that two major variables, regionality and
breadth of product line are important tools to discriminate both the strategic
stance of retail firms as well as their economic performance .

This study has

shown that major operating characteristics and ratios of firms vary significantly by the breadth of product line they carry and by the geographical scope
of the firm.

Analyses of these ratios strongly suggested that the strategic

or competitive s tances of firms could be inferred or determined from the
breadth

o!

product offering and geographical scope.

Even more dramatic was

the clear relationship between product line and geopgrahical stances and economic performance.
This study found that regionally based firms perform slightly better than
locally based firms .

On

the other hand, firms which are national in scope

tend to be very high performers.

Despite the complexities and management de-

mands of operating nationally, there appears to be an important payoff for
those firms pushing t o national strategies.
In terms of breadth of product line, this study indicated that the narrower product line strategies on the whole outperformed the broader product
lioe strategies.

The narrowest product line strategies, the specialty stores,

were clearly very strong economic performers.

Further, it was found that

single line strategies yielded very high or very low performance depending on
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the gross margins achieved by the product line .

Thus single line strategies

were very successful if they were associated with high gross margins and were
very poor if associated with low gross margins.
gies performed slightly below average.

Firms with full line strate-

.

It appears that well defined and targeted pathways to growth are the most
viable ones.

Thus it would seem that strategies aimed at growing in any di-

rection (regionality, diversity or product line) would be very ill advised.
Rather the choice of fairly narrow product lines which are well defined and
capable of sustaining substantial gross margins in the marketplace and which
are taken to either regional or national status would seem to lead to the best
returns.
It has been demonstrated that regional scope and breadth of product line
in and of themselves are clearly central features of strategic posture and are
important determiners of economic performance.
variables represent two of

t~e

As we consider that these two

major growth vectors or opportunities available

for a firm to choose to grow, the importance of these variables in strategy
formulation as well as strategic research becomes clearer.

Further research

is clearly needed and currently underway to examine the interaction of these
components

on economic performance.

But further research is clearly warranted

on these variables and their role on strategies and performance among nonretailing firms.

Clearly, the scope of market operations, breadth of product

lines carried and the amount and kind of diversity in the firm's product/
market offerings are key and central elements of corporate strategy and warrant far more research and effort than has been generated to date.

This study

and a few others are beginning to suggest that these same components are also
central determinants of the strategic growth opportunities open to firms and
are important determinants of economic performance .

Given the strategic
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centrality, oportunity and impact, far greater research needs to be given to
the role these elements play in the strategy formulation process .

;
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